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Abstract 
Previous studies have established a link between Human Capital and performance 
both at the firm and the individual level.  These studies have shown that performance can 
be improved with additional personnel and/or higher education levels.  This study 
attempts to build on this relationship by using the Cobb-Douglas Production function to 
relate inputs to outputs.  The inputs to the function are the number of cost analysts 
positions, military and civilian, and an education variable for the number of master’s 
degrees in the field.  The measure of output is the average cost overrun of Air Force 
contracts.   A time series regression was conducted while controlling for other economic 
factors such as budgetary fluctuations and inflation.  The results show positive effects of 
human capital on performance.  Other policy implications of the study are the importance 
of budgetary stability, inflation predictions and the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA).   
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 THE IMPACT OF HUMAN CAPITAL ON THE COST OF AIR FORCE 
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The primary purpose of this research was to determine if there is a relationship 
between the number of cost analysts, their education and training levels and the cost 
variance of Air Force contracts.  In this study, the cost variance measurement was the 
amount of cost overruns.  The research looked at both officers and civilians within the 
cost analysis career field. 
General Issue 
 
One of the ongoing struggles within the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Acquisition community is how to produce weapon systems within specified budgets.  
There have been several studies conducted to determine the actual amount of cost 
variance that has occurred within DoD acquisition systems.  Depending on the time 
period analyzed and the type of variance used in determining a cost difference, these 
studies found that costs have increased by an average of 8% to 40% (Jacques S. Gansler 
1989; Jeffrey A. Drezner, Jeanne M. Jarvaise, Ron Hess, Daniel M. Norton, and Paul G. 
Hough 1993; David S. Christensen and James A. Gordon 1998; William J. Swank, Paul 
A. Alfieri, Charles K. Gailey III, and Raymond W. Reig 2000; James Smirnoff 2006).  
Typically, the increased costs results in a request for additional funds, but in extreme 
cases, inaccurate estimates can lead to program cancellations, and the loss of billions of 
dollars, as was the case for the A-12, a controversial program that was cancelled due to 
overly optimistic estimates (Christensen 1994).   
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 Because of the amount of money involved with DoD projects, multi-billions of 
dollars, this issue has received significant attention from senior leaders in the DoD, and 
the legislative and executive branches of government.  As such, various reform measures 
have been instituted over the past 40 years.  The empirical studies on the effectiveness of 
these reforms have found mixed results.  Drezner (1993) looked at 197 acquisition 
programs from 1960 to 1990 and found no improvement in cost variance due to the 
reforms.  In addition, David S. Christensen, David A. Searle and Caisse Vickery (1999) 
found that one of the biggest reform measures, the Packard Commission, had no impact 
on cost variance.  Smirnoff (2006), however, found that when controlling for such macro-
economic factors as annual procurement budget, research and development budget, and 
unexpected inflation, some of the reforms have been effective at controlling costs.   
There have been several studies to date which have attempted to explain where 
cost variance primarily occurs and why cost estimates are inaccurate, with the goal of 
instituting meaningful reforms.  These studies have determined that cost variance is 
primarily influenced by the characteristics of the program (program size, stage of the 
program, urgency, degree of testing, and production rate) and the characteristics of the 
weapon system (technological maturity, difficulty of technology, type of commodity, and 
performance characteristics) (Vince Sipple, Edward White and Michael Greiner 2004).  
These studies do not provide a policy lever that can be used to reduce cost variance.  
They only identify the characteristics of programs that experience an increase in cost; as a 
result, it is difficult for policy makers to use these findings to prevent the unexpected 
increase in the cost of weapon systems.  More needs to be done on these earlier reports to 
make them useful for decision makers. 
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 One such factor which could influence cost variance and could provide a tool for 
policy usage is the quality of the estimates.  The idea that cost overruns are attributed to 
an error in the initial cost estimates was suggested by Christensen, Searle and Vickery 
(1999) and Jeffrey Drezner, Jean Jarvaise, Ron Hess, Daniel Norton, and Paul Hough 
(1993). Christensen, Searle and Vickery (1999) noted that cost realism is a problem in 
cost estimation.  In addition, Bobby J. Pannel (1994) indicated that most of the estimation 
errors are in the estimation of production costs.  Pannel identified estimation errors as 
those which are not attributable to any program decisions made in the production stage.  
 While these studies simply identify the problem, some private sector studies go 
deeper into the issue. Even though these studies are not specific to DoD cost estimating, a 
general cost estimating analogy can be drawn.  The two types of studies are those relating 
the number of personnel to performance (Xi Li 2002) and those relating human capital to 
performance (Gary Becker 1964; Anne Bartel 1994; Lisa Lynch and Sandra Black 1995; 
Alan Krueger and Cecilia Rouse 1998).  These studies concluded that the performance of 
the firm (Bartel 1994 used net sales) and of the individual (Krueger and Rouse 1998 used 
performance awards, job upgrades, job bids and job attendance) can be improved with 
more personnel or higher education levels.   In addition, two studies (Lynch and Black 
1995; J.H. Bishop 1994) found that education produces indirect benefits such as 
innovativeness and the ability to better adapt to new tasks and technologies.   
 Smirnoff (2006) evaluated the effect of the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act of 1990 (DAWIA) which mandated certain education and training 
requirements for acquisition personnel. In his model, he found that this act actually had a 
positive correlation with cost overruns, meaning the establishment of this act correlated 
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 with more cost overruns.    This seems counterintuitive; so this variable was also added to 
this study to see if different results are produced with a different analysis technique. 
With the exception of Smirnoff (2006), these studies suggest estimation error, or 
the performance of Air Force cost estimators, could be improved by either increasing the 
amount of personnel or by providing more education to those already employed.   If 
estimation errors are reduced, this may lead to fewer cost overruns for the Air Force.  
However, the current state of the Air Force makes this difficult.  According to the Air 
Force Cost Analysis Agency, Air Force cost analysis resources are down 60% (300 
positions) since 1994, while the total AF positions are down 13% (Thomas Dupre 2005).  
In addition, the Air Force cost field has experienced cuts, even while other services are 
increasing their cost analysis personnel; Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) cost 
personnel have increased 91% since 1992 and NASA cost personnel have increased 
250% (Dupre 2005).  Concurrently, among the DoD, the Air Force is historically the 
poorest performer when it comes to cost growth.   During the development stage, the Air 
Force experienced a 78% increase in cost overruns, compared with 58% for the DoD 
(Dupre 2005), and its not getting any better. The Air Force is expecting a 76% growth in 
costs over the life of programs currently in procurement (Dupre 2005).   The current 
feeling in the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency is that the reason the Air Force is doing 
poorly compared with the other services is because of a lack of cost personnel (Dupre 
2005).  
 The FY06 National Defense Authorization Act – House Armed Services 
Committee Report has directed the Air Force to correct the situation and for the Secretary 
of the Air Force to take steps necessary to correct the problems in cost analysis (Dupre 
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 2005).  The Secretary of the Air Force reasoned that an immediate fix to the cost overrun 
problem is to increase the number of cost analysts in the Air Force.  The Air Force has 
been approved to add 50 more personnel to the career field.  This study will attempt to 
determine if adding more personnel will indeed fix the problem or if the cost analysis 
career field is already at a suitable strength level.   
 The rest of this study will be organized as follows; chapter 2 provides a review of 
the literature related to this field of study, chapter 3 uses this literature and develops a 
method for analyzing the relationship between cost overruns and human capital, chapter 4 
provides the results of the analysis with a discussion of the significant findings, and 
finally, chapter 5 provides additional discussion on the topic and provides areas for future 
research. 
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 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether or not a relationship exists 
between the number of AF cost analysts, both military and civilian, investments in human 
capital, and AF contract cost variances.  In order to give a background of the topic, this 
chapter provides an overview of the previous research that has been conducted in this 
area.   
Cost Variance 
There are two methods that measure cost variance, which is a cost increase or 
decrease in a program, namely, cost growth and cost overruns. We’ll reserve discussion 
of the specifics of each for the end of the chapter; however, Vince Sipple, Edward White, 
and Michael Greiner (2004) published a study which synthesized all research on cost 
variance to date.  In the article, the authors summarized studies from the Balistic Missile 
Defense Organization Study in 2000, a 1993 RAND study, a NAVAIR study in 2001, a 
study by Christensen and Templin in 2000, a study by Henry Eskew in 2000, an Institute 
for Defense Analysis (IDA) study in 1994, and a 2001 RAND study.  In their review, 
Sipple, White and Greiner (2004) noted that while these studies only identify where cost 
variance occurs, they are the starting point to identify a model that allows cost variance to 
be predicted and controlled.   
Estimation error is one factor that has been highlighted, almost as an afterthought, 
in several studies.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group (OSD CAIG 2001) did an extensive examination of the causes of cost variances.  
In this examination, the underlying reasons seemed to result from either decisions or 
mistakes that were made regarding the program.  Decisions that drove variances included 
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 requirement changes, schedule changes, and changes in acquisition strategy.  Estimation 
mistakes included assumption or estimation changes, schedule slips not attributable to 
technical problems and any other changes not made as a result of a discretionary 
decision.  In sum, the OSD attributed more than half of cost variance to errors.  
Christensen, Searle and Vickery (1999) focused on the idea of errors or mistakes when 
they concluded the costs are not only underestimated initially, but all subsequent 
estimates of the final program cost are underestimated.  The authors attribute this to 
estimation error or other causal factors not identified.  Pannel (1994) suggested some of 
those additional factors, indicating that the majority of estimation errors are due to errors 
in the production cost estimations.  These errors in the estimation of production costs 
arise because of method errors, omissions, schedule slips attributable to technical 
problems, weight growth, and inadequately scoped engineering and software 
development efforts (Pannel 1994).   Sipple, White, and Greiner (2004) diverged from 
this type of thinking by suggesting that costs might be controlled with additional 
manpower and training.   
Human Capital 
The idea that human capital can affect performance is something that has been 
explored in the private sector.  Richard Blundell, Lorraine Dearden, Costas Meghir, and 
Barbara Sianesi (1999) state there are three components to human capital: “early ability 
(whether acquired or innate); qualifications and knowledge acquired through formal 
education; and skills, competencies and expertise acquired through training on the job” 
(p. 2).  They go on to assert that investing in human capital is the same as investing in 
other capital assets.  An up-front fee is incurred for the tuition, loss of wages, or training 
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 fees but a return on investment is expected (Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, Sianesi 1999). 
Specifically, this study found that education and training have an important impact on the 
individual, firm and economy.  Past findings do support the sequence of relationships that 
are hypothesized.  That is, studies have related the number of personnel to performance 
(Li 2002; James Shaw and Jeff Weekley 1985).  Others have conducted studies to 
determine how much return can be expected from investing in training or education 
(Bishop 1994; Krueger and Rouse 1998; Bartel 1989, 1994; Lynch and Black 1995) 
Numbers of Personnel  
Several studies have concluded that the number of personnel making the 
estimation can have a positive effect on the quality of the estimation.  In analyzing the 
performance of stock analysts, Li (2002), for instance, found the analysts’ predictive 
power began to decline as their coverage exceeded 12-13 stocks.  At some point if a 
worker takes on too much work, his or her performance begins to decline. The analyst 
does not have time to conduct a thorough review of the stocks and their estimates become 
inaccurate.   The same could be true with a military cost analyst.  If a military cost analyst 
is working on a large program that requires several estimates, he might not be able to 
conduct as comprehensive review as possible and could produce results which are less 
accurate.   In addition, there are other factors involved with being overworked.  Shaw and 
Weekley (1985) conducted an experimental study in which they gave subjects word 
puzzles to solve in order to determine the effects of overload and underload situations.  In 
their study, they measured perceived pressure, self-esteem, task enjoyment, resentment, 
anxiety, depression, hostility, and performance and found overload situations caused the 
subjects to feel more pressure, have less task enjoyment and feel more depressed (Shaw 
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 and Weekly 1985).   If this sort of situation were to be prolonged, you would expect it to 
have a negative effect on performance.   
Education Levels of Personnel 
 Performance cannot be improved by simply adding more personnel.   It is also 
important that the right people are doing the job with the right skill set and education 
levels. There have been numerous private sector studies on human capital and the 
performance of firms.  Becker (1964), in his pioneering work on human capital, stated the 
most important investments in human capital are education and training.  In the years 
since, there have been two types of studies which relate education and training to 
performance:  those at the individual level and those at the firm level.   
Individual Level of Analysis 
 At the individual level, Bishop (1994) used data from the National Federation of 
Independent Business survey to look at the impact of training on newly hired employees.  
The results of the study found training raises productivity by 16%, where productivity 
was measured subjectively with a survey that asked employers to rate the productivity of 
the new employees.  However, as noted by Lynch and Black (1995), this method is a 
subjective measure of performance and is not comparable across firms or within firms.    
Krueger and Rouse (1998) measured performance objectively by using data from 
records from both a service and manufacturing company, that were supplemented with 
subjective measures.  They found training was positively correlated with the occurrence 
of job bids, upgrades, performance awards, and job attendance across industries.  This 
could make the argument that higher education levels could lead to better performance, or 
in this case better cost estimations and lower cost overruns.   
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 Firm Level of Analysis 
Other studies have looked at the effect of training and education on the 
performance at the firm or organizational level.  Bartel (1994) uses the Cobb-Douglas 
production function to estimate the impact of employee training.  Her effort was an early 
attempt to address the gap in the literature on the effects of training and productivity at 
the firm or organizational level, because most of the prior research on this topic was done 
at the individual level.  She found that organizations that were operating below the 
expected productivity increased their productivity after establishing training programs.  
These findings were echoed by Lynch and Black (1995).   
Lynch and Black (1995), again applying the Cobb-Douglas Production function, 
used data from the National Center on the Educational Quality of the Workforce and  
confirmed the influence of capital investments on organizational level outcomes.  
Specifically, they found that a 10% increase in the average education levels of employees 
resulted in an 8.5% increase in productivity in manufacturing and 12.7% in non-
manufacturing firms.    
Bartel (1989) used a survey on human resource management and measures of 
financial performance to determine a correlation between training and productivity.  She 
concluded training increases productivity by 16%; however, the low 6% survey response 
rate could place the actual productivity rate at a different number.  Also, another problem 
with Bartel’s 1989 study is that most firms used in her study were multiple establishment 
firms.  The measure of output, financial performance, was for the firm as a whole and not 
the specific locations.  Based on this study, there could be a problem with correlating 
10 
 training, which is an input at the specific locations, to output, which is a measure of the 
entire firm’s performance (Lynch and Black 1995).   
Indirect Benefits of Education 
In addition, the studies of education show there are indirect benefits to education.  
Workers with higher education levels can learn how to learn (Lynch and Black 1995), 
can adapt to new tasks and technologies, and are more innovative (Bishop 1994).  
Specifically, Bishop (1994) found that the number of years schooled increased an 
innovation measure by 7.8%.  
Summary 
This chapter showed there is a historical link between human capital and 
performance of both the individual and the firm.  The next chapter will use this link to 
build a model to test the relationship between Air Force cost analysis human capital and 
cost overruns.   
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 III.  METHOD 
In order to deal with some of the shortcomings in the literature linking human 
capital to performance, this study will use an organizational level of analysis and an 
objective measure of performance.   The method of analysis will be the Cobb-Douglas 
production function similar to Bartel (1994).  In addition, the performance measure will 
be the amount of cost variance per year.  Following is a description of how this cost 
variance will be captured.   
Measuring Contract Performance 
The performance of contracts is determined by various factors such as its schedule 
and whether or not the final product met the requirements of the customer. One 
performance factor which receives a lot of scrutiny is cost.   There are two methods that 
measure a cost increase or decrease in a program, namely, cost growth and cost overrun.  
Cost growth is calculated by subtracting the initial estimate from the final program cost, 
while a cost overrun is computed by subtracting the budgeted cost of work performed 
(including budget changes) from the actual cost of work performed (Christensen and 
Gordon 1998).  This is also consistent with the definition provided by the Earned Value 
Management System (Earned Value Management 2006).   The appropriate measure (i.e., 
cost growth or overrun) varies based on the researcher’s purpose.  When attempting to 
identify errors in estimation, a cost overrun is the better measurement.  Factors which are 
out of the program’s control, such as funding instabilities and changes in the scope of a 
requirement, can lead to cost growth but not to cost overruns (Christensen and Gordon 
1998).   The final budget, which is used in the cost overrun calculation, is a better 
12 
 measure of how well a program’s budget was estimated.    Figure 1 captures the overall 
cost variance computation (Earned Value Management 2006) 
 
Figure 1: NASA Earned Value Management (2006)  
The actuals line, also known as the Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) 
reflects the amount spent to date, or the amount paid to the contractor   The plan line, also 
called the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS), is the planned expenditures, or 
the budget of the contract.  The earned value line is the Budgeted Cost of Work 
Performed (BCWP) and is the value of completed work.  The value of the completed 
work is what takes into account requirement and budget changes.  A cost variance is 
computed as the difference between the ACWP and the BCWP.  In other words, it is the 
difference between what has been spent and what has actually been accomplished.  
Because this measurement takes into account the budgeted amount (program changes and 
changes in quantity) the cost variance is equivalent to a cost overrun.  Cost growth, on the 
other hand, would be the difference between the ACWP line and the initial budget (not 
13 
 shown on the graph).  This form of measuring cost variance would not take into account 
re-baselines of the budget or quantity changes, and so it is not a good measure of 
estimation accuracy. 
Data and Variables 
Dependent Variable 
To conduct this study, data was collected on the average cost overruns of Air 
Force weapon systems per year from 1970 to 2006 using Earned Value Management data 
(EVMS) from the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES).  The amount of 
overrun for each weapon system will be consolidated by year to give the average cost 
overrun for that year in percentage terms (Earned Value Management 2006):  
%Overrun= (ACWP-BCWP)  * 100   (1) 
       (BCWP) 
 
Independent Variables 
Personnel numbers and education levels were collected from the Air Force 
Personnel Center, the agency responsible for maintaining personnel records for each 
occupational Air Force specialty.  The numbers represent those identified as cost 
analysts, using a specific occupational code within the Air Force personnel system 
(officers having the Air Force duty occupational code 65W).  Because there is no Cost 
Analysis career field for civilians, an estimate has to be made as to the actual numbers 
that are performing cost analysis duties.  The civilians in cost analysis come from two 
career fields, Occupational Series 501, Financial Management and Program, and 1515, 
Operations Research.  Not all civilians in these occupational series perform cost duties, 
so we eliminated all but those civilians funded within the Program Element Code (PEC) 
14 
 72806K, Acquisition.   It can be assumed that civilians in this PEC who are in the 501 
series and 1515 series are doing work related to cost analysis.   This method was 
crosschecked with the current civilian cost analysts manning levels on record at the Air 
Force Cost Analysis Agency and produced similar results. 
Similar to the work done by Smirnoff (2006), a dummy variable for training was  
added.  Starting in 1994, the dummy variable captures the effects when all the provisions 
of the DAWIA Act of 1990 were put in place (William J. Perry 1995).  Smirnoff (2006) 
found a positive correlation of this act on cost overruns.  This research will determine if 
this same finding holds true using a Cobb-Douglas function.   
Control Variables 
In order to account for other factors which could contribute to the amount of cost 
overruns per year, control variables were added to the model.  The Air Force Research 
and Development budget per year was added as a technological proxy.  One of the 
common criticisms of inaccurate estimates is that new weapon systems are becoming 
more complex and thus are more difficult to estimate.  If this is the case, more complex 
systems with higher technologies will require more Research and Development funds.  
Of course, if the number of R&D programs is increased, this would also cause the R&D 
budget to increase.  So there could be some error in using this variable as a proxy for 
technology level.   
Another factor to control for is the amount of analytical work which is outsourced 
to private contractors.  Trying to determine the actual amount of contractors who are 
currently doing cost estimates is a difficult task, let alone trying to find out numbers from 
previous years.  In order to estimate this and provide a proxy for the effects of contractor 
15 
 work, a raw number for the total number of people doing defense related work in private 
industry was added to the model.  This provides a trend for the amount of analytical work 
that was outsourced per year.   Given that this is an estimate, this introduces the 
possibility for errors in the estimation.   
Because this research is dealing with estimation error, unexpected inflation is 
another control variable we added to the model.  Because of the large amounts of dollars 
being expended, minor changes in the actual amount of inflation can have large effects on 
overruns.   
The last two control variables are the total budget and the procurement budget of 
the Air Force.  These last two control variables should account for any budget 
fluctuations that may constrain programs and cause them to be delayed, and consequently 
become over budget.   
Model 
 The basic Cobb-Douglas Production function is given by: (Charles Cobb and Paul 
Douglas 1928). 
    Q = AK^ βL^ γ     (2) 
Where Q is a measure of output, A is a technological parameter, K is capital, and L is 
labor.  The model suggests that as more capital or more labor is added to an organization, 
the output increases.   This model was adapted by simply adding another input variable, 
education (Lynch and Black 1995).      
    Q = K^βL^γE^λ     (3) 
In this study, Q is the amount of cost overruns, K represents the capital of the defense 
industries, L is reported labor, and E is education. L is simply the number of personnel in 
16 
 the cost analysis career field, E is the education level of the personnel in this field.  
Finally, we conducted a log-log transformation on equation (3) to linearize the functional 
form for ease of estimation.   
   ln Q = βlnk + γlnL + λlnE + αX + ε   (4) 
The natural log was not conducted on the budget, DAWIA and unexpected 
inflation variables due to the existence of observations with negative or zero values.  As 
such, a semi-log interpretation will be made on these variables.  The additional variable X 
is added to represent the vector of control variables.  In the Cobb-Douglas Function, 
output can be many things but in this study it will be assumed that output is equal to cost 
overruns.  Bartel (1994) used net sales as a proxy for output.  A cost overrun is similar to 
a negative “net sale” for the Air Force, it takes away funds from other projects.   It is also 
assumed that the capital of the defense industries, specifically, the Industrial Production 
of the Defense Industries, will be a good proxy for K, since this study is looking at 
contracts.  These contracts are undertaken by the defense industries using in large part, 
their own capital, not the Air Force’s capital.  The use of Industrial Production data is a 
standard proxy capital in the literature.    
While there is a technological parameter in the equation, in some studies using the 
Cobb-Douglas production function, this is omitted.   When a log transformation is 
conducted on the Cobb-Douglas function, the technological parameter, A, becomes the 
intercept in a linear equation.  Since this study is only looking at the relationship between 
personnel, education, and cost overruns, which is the slope of the Cobb-Douglas function, 
the technological parameter will be given a value of 1, with no loss of generality. 
  
17 
 Summary 
This chapter provided a review of the model to be used in the analysis, how it was 
derived, the variables being considered, why they are important and how they were 
collected.  In the next chapter, the results of the analysis will be presented. 
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 IV. RESULTS 
 
 
 To begin, the key parameters of the analysis, cost overruns and military and 
civilian analysts were plotted against time, to get a visual representation of the data.   Due 
to the range of the civilian data, this study ranged from 1988 through 2005.  
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Figure 2: Cost Overruns vs. Military and Civilian Analysts 
 
Below are the summary statistics of the database.  The mean cost overrun is 
9.79% with a range of 0.284% to 25.71%.   The number of military and civilian analyst 
range from 487 to 834 with a mean of 589.  The percentage of MA/MS degrees averaged 
at 47% and ranged from 41.5% to 53.5%.  This information will be used later in the 
chapter in the interpretation of the significant coefficients.    
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 Variable       Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Overrun Percent 17 9.79 10.17 0.284 27.716
AF Budget Change (Lag 2) 17 -0.01 0.08 -0.095 0.228
R&D Budget Change (Lag 2) 17 0.003 0.10 -0.154 0.287
Procurement Change (Lag 2) 17 -0.001 0.14 -0.212 0.322
Percent MA/MS  17 47.00 3.32 41.487 53.541
Capital 17 112.26 16.29 90.100 148.500
Number of Analysts 17 589.12 122.87 487 834
AFIT Grads (Lag 1) 17 11.29 3.16 6 17
Unexpected Inflation 17 0.0002 0.005 -0.010 0.010
Defense Employment 17 2777.94 540.22 2180 3850
DAWIA 17 0.71 0.47 0 1  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Pre-Estimation Specification Tests 
 
In order to conduct a time-series regression analysis, both the dependent and 
independent variables must be stationary.  Any trends or drifts in the variables can lead to 
a spurious regression and faulty conclusions.  If two non-stationary variables that have no 
relationship (for example height of a tree and GDP) are regressed on each other, it will 
appear as if the height of the tree is affecting GDP.   The common procedure for ensuring 
stationarity is to first test for it using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. If the variable is 
found to be non stationary, the variable is replaced with the change in that variable from 
one year to the next, called the first difference.  Using this procedure, the dependent 
variable, Number of Analysts, Education, Defense Employment and Capital variables 
required a first difference to become stationary.   
The next step was to determine the lag lengths of the independent variables.  The 
theory behind lags is that the presence of an independent variable may not be felt until 
later time periods in the dependent variable.  To determine the appropriate lag length, 
each independent variable was regressed on the dependent variable with the results of the 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and adjusted R squared shown in table 2.  Because 
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 adding an additional lag decreases the amount of useable observations and therefore 
causes the AIC to decrease, the AIC was divided by the number of observations to give 
the variance per observation; this was crosschecked with the R2 value of the regression.  
In all cases, the AIC was minimized when the R2 was maximized, except for the capital 
variable.  As such, this lag was defaulted to a no year lag.  The minimum AIC of the 
procurement variable occurred at the second lag with an R2 of close to 0.00.  Lag 0 and 
lag 3 of this variable also had an R2 of close to zero.  As such, the second lag was chosen 
in order to be consistent with the other budget variables.  All variables, with the 
exception of AFIT Graduates which had a lag of 1, and the budget variables, which had a 
lag of 2, were maximized at no lags.   The 2 year lag on the budget changes is to be 
expected.  When budgets change, schedules and requirements consequently change to 
free up additional funds.  As a result, an immediate effect probably would not be felt.   It 
is reasonable to assume that the true effects of a budget change will not occur until later 
years.  
 
     Cost Analysts     AFIT Grads        Capital           DAWIA   AF Budget Change
AIC R2 AIC R2 AIC R2 AIC R2 AIC R2
No Lag 2.71 0.08 2.61 -0.04 2.32 -0.02 2.29 0.03 2.33 0.00
One Lag 2.80 0.00 2.48 0.14 2.30 -0.03 2.37 0.03 2.32 -0.02
Two Lags 2.91 -0.06 2.63 0.05 2.30 -0.03 2.36 0.00 2.23 0.04
Three Lags 2.89 -0.06 2.78 -0.05 2.33 -0.03 2.37 -0.03 2.28 -0.02
Four Lags 2.93 -0.02 2.84 -0.02 2.37 -0.04 2.35 -0.01 2.27 0.03
Five Lags 2.96 0.03 2.86 -0.05 2.40 -0.04 2.40 -0.03 2.28 0.04
               Education  Defense Employment     Unexpected Inlfation  R&D Budget Change Proc. Budget Change
AIC R2 AIC R2 AIC R2 AIC R2 AIC R2
No Lag 2.55 0.22 2.33 -0.02 2.28 0.00 2.33 -0.01 2.32 0.008
One Lag 2.73 0.07 2.37 -0.03 2.33 -0.03 2.40 -0.01 2.33 -0.03
Two Lags 2.78 0.07 2.40 -0.03 2.35 -0.03 2.24 0.02 2.27 -0.006
Three Lags 2.90 -0.06 2.43 -0.04 2.37 -0.01 2.27 0.00 2.27 -0.002
Four Lags 2.93 -0.02 2.46 -0.04 2.41 -0.05 2.32 -0.02 2.32 -0.03
Five Lags 2.95 0.04 2.48 -0.02 2.41 -0.01 2.36 -0.03 2.34 -0.01  
 
 
 
Table 2: Lag Structure Determination 
 
 
21 
 Post-Estimation Specification Tests 
With the configuration of the dependent and independent variables determined, the 
next step was to perform diagnostic checks of the model.  Tests for multi-collinearity, 
heteroskedasticity, auto-correlation, cointigration, normal distribution of the error terms 
and omitted variable bias were conducted.   
To test for multi-collinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was calculated, see 
Appendix A.   The mean VIF for the variables in the model was 3.79.  Ideally, this value 
would be below 10 to ensure that no collinearity was present, so this model is within the 
safe zone for not having multi-collinearity.   
In order to test for heteroskedascity, two methods were used; a visual inspection as 
well as an empirical test of the data.  To empirically test for heteroskedasticty, the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test was used.  With a p-value of 0.4672, it is not possible 
to reject the null hypothesis that heteroskedasticity is present.  For a visual inspection of 
the residuals, see Appendix B.   
 To test for auto-correlation of the residuals, the Durbin Watson’s d-statistics and 
the Durbin’s alternative test for autocorrelation were used.  The d-statistic was 2.36.  
With 17 observations and 10 variables, the d-statistic should be between 0.197 and 3.184 
in order to not be auto-correlated.  As such, the d-statistic was within the safe zone.   The 
alternative test for autocorrelation yielded a prob>chi2 of 0.287, with the null being no 
autocorrelation, so it is not possible to reject that there is no autocorrelation present. 
 The next test was to ensure there was no cointigration of the error terms.  Even 
though the variables are stationary or made stationary by first differencing, the 
combination of the variables could be creating a non-stationary process.   The Augmented 
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 Dickey Fuller test was conducted on the residuals to ensure they are stationary.  The 
result was a test stastistic of -6.65, with a 1% critical value of -3.75, giving a p-value of 
0.000.  Therefore, we can be assured that the residuals are stationary.   
 The last test is to ensure that the error terms are normally distributed.  To test for 
this, two different tests were conducted; a visual inspection, and an empirical test.  The 
visual inspection of the residuals, located in Appendix C, shows that the error terms 
appear to fairly normally distributed.  The Shapiro-Wilk test revealed that the degree of 
skewness and kurtosis were significant to the 0.422 and 0.382 level respectively, with a 
joint prob>chi2 of 0.4549, not enough to conclude that the residuals are not normally 
distributed.   
The Ramsey RESET test was used to test for omitted variable bias and for 
misspecification of the model.  With a prob>chi2, it is not possible to reject the null 
hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables.  In addition, exogeneity was not 
considered an issue since this model is derived from the theoretical relationship of the 
Cobb-Douglas Production Function.   
Results 
The results, with the required specification changes based on the above diagnostic 
tests, are displayed in table 3 below: 
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 Number of obs = 17
R-squared 0.8365
Adjusted R-squared 0.5639
 
 
 
 1st Diff ln (Cost Overrun Percentage) Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
Proc. Budget Change (Lag 2) 2.86 2.41 1.19 0.281
R&D Budget Change (Lag 2) 3.23 2.86 1.13 0.302
Total Budget Change (Lag 2)** -17.62 5.41 -3.25 0.017
1st Diff ln (Education)* -9.64 4.53 -2.13 0.077
Ln (AFIT Grads) lag 1 -0.50 0.84 -0.6 0.572
1st Diff ln (Capital) 6.56 3.78 1.73 0.134
1st Diff ln (Military/Civilian Analysts)* -10.06 4.86 -2.07 0.084
DAWIA*** -2.21 0.54 -4.1 0.006
1st Diff ln (Defense Employment)** 12.56 4.46 2.82 0.030
Unexpected Inflation 108.34 62.31 1.74 0.133
_cons 2.37 1.95 1.21 0.270
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes       Table 3: Time-Series Regression Results 
*Significant to the 10% level 
**Significant to the 5% level 
***Significant to the 1% level 
 
According to the results, total budget change, education, number of analysts 
DAWIA and Defense Employment are all significantly correlated with the amount of cost 
overruns in a given year.   
The results show that adding more analysts is correlated with a reduction in cost 
overruns.  Specifically, for every 1% the number of military analysts is increased, the 
cost overrun percentage decreases by 10%.  On average, there are 597 cost analysts in the 
AF and a 10% contract cost overrun occurs.  If the amount of military analysts is 
increased by 1%, or 6 analysts, the percentage of cost overruns could be expected to 
decrease by (10*.1) = 1.0.   
Increasing the number of MA/MS degrees is also correlated with a reduction in 
cost overruns.  For every 1% the percentage of MA/MS degrees is increased, cost 
overruns drop by 0.0964%.  On average, there are 46.7%, or 279, analysts with a MA/MS 
degree.   If this number is increased by 1%, or 3 more MA/MS degrees, cost overruns 
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 would decrease by (10*.00096) = 0.0096.  Adding 30 more MA/MS degrees could 
decrease overruns by 0.096.     
The Air Force total budget was also a significant contributor to overruns.  
According to the results, for every 1% the total budget is increases, the amount of cost 
overruns would decrease by 0.176%.  On average, with a 10% cost overrun, adding 1% to 
the budget could decrease the amount of overruns by (10*.00176) = 0.0176.  This makes 
a strong case for the importance of budget stability in acquisition programs.   
The proxy for defense contractors, defense employment, was also significant.  
However, it had the opposite sign that would be expected.  The coefficient indicates that 
if the amount of defense employees is increased by 1000, overruns would actually 
increase by 12.5%.  This seems counterintuitive.  A possible explanation is that this 
variable is also acting as a size variable.  As the Air Force gets bigger, we incur more 
overruns.  It could be that the Air Force has become too large and has entered into an area 
of diseconomies of scale.  This fact could also be seen in the capital variable.  Even 
though this variable was not significant, it had a positive sign as well indicating that has 
the Air Force gets bigger, more overruns follow.   
The last significant variable was the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act.  This variable had a coefficient of -2.21.  Because this is a dummy 
variable, transforming this into a meaningful number requires the use of the equation 
(Patricia A. Champ, Kevin J. Boyle and Thomas C. Brown 2003) 
g = (e^β-1)*100 
Where g is the percentage effect of the dependent variable, and β is the coefficient of the 
variable.  The resulting percentage effect DAWIA has on cost overruns is 8.9%.  This 
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 would mean, on average with a cost overrun percentage of 10%, the occurrence of 
DAWIA has dropped cost overruns by 0.89.   This is counter to other studies that found a 
positive relationship between DAWIA and overruns.  It could be that when controlling 
for human capital factors, DAWIA has actually helped to reduce the amount of overruns.   
 The unexpected inflation variable is also worth mentioning.  This variable was 
marginally significant to the 0.13 level.  However, the sign of the variable was positive, 
as you would expect, indicating that as the amount of unexpected inflation increases, cost 
overruns increase.  The magnitude of the variable indicated that if unexpected inflation 
increased by 1%, the amount of overruns increase by approximately 1%, almost a 1 to 1 
ratio.   
 Some of the magnitudes of the coefficients seem relatively small but when you 
consider the amount of money that is involved, the values are fairly significant.  Table 4 
below summarizes the significant variables and puts them into prospective in terms of the 
dollar amounts that are involved.   
 
Procurement Budget 2006    $32.6B 
R&D Budget 2006     $21.1B
Total       $53.7B 
10% Average Overrun         0.1
Total Overruns      $5.37B 
 
        Percentage Effect Dollar Amount 
Add 3 degrees     0.10%  $5,155,200.00 
Add 6 Analysts     0.10%  $5,370,000.00 
Subtract 1000 Defense Employees  0.13%  $6,981,000.00 
Add 1% to Budget    0.17%  $9,129,000.00 
Decrease Unexpected Inflation 1%  0.10%  $5,370,000.00
Total percent decrease    0.60%  $32,005,200.00 
 
Table 4: Associated Dollar Amounts for Significant Coefficients 
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Given that the 2006 Air Force procurement budget was $32.6B and the R&D 
budget was $21.1B, for a total of $53.7B, and overruns average 10% per year, there is an 
overrun of $5.37B per year.  Multiplying this number by the associated percentage effects 
of the significant coefficients, the column on the right shows how much money is 
involved with these changes.   It can be seen that by making these changes, the Air Force 
could either save or more accurately budget for approximately $32B dollars.  It is yet to 
be determined if this is an actual savings or just money that would be more accurately 
predicted.  More discussion of this will follow in the next chapter.   
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 V. DISCUSSION 
  
 An area of future research could be to optimize the number of cost analysts and 
their education levels based on the cost of acquiring new personnel, sending them to 
school, giving them training and finally enough experience to become productive 
workers.  Taking this cost into account and comparing it to the expected decrease in cost 
overruns, a better decision can be made as to whether or not the Air Force will ultimately 
do better with more analysts.   This is because a decrease in overruns may or may not 
coincide with an actual saving.   The results show that adding more analysts can decrease 
the amount of overruns.  However, this could just indicate that we are better able to 
estimate the cost of the weapon system and therefore would not incur any overruns.   The 
cost of the weapon system remains the same; we just better predicted the price.  The 
greatest benefit would occur in correctly forecasting budgets and allocating resources.  It 
was seen that budget fluctuations have a significant effect on overruns.  If we can more 
accurately budget resources, we can subsequently maintain stable budgets for acquisition 
programs and could then possibly save money.  
 Also, the number of observations in the study was relatively low, only 17.  One 
way to increase the number of observations is to incorporate the other services into the 
study.  This would greatly enhance the credibility of the results.  We suspect that the 
same results will hold if the other services are added since it appears the same 
relationship exists; it was seen that the other services are building up their cost analysis 
manpower and at the same time they are experiencing less overruns than the Air Force.   
 The effect of budget fluctuations is another area that needs further study.  Even 
though the coefficient on the Total Budget variable was negative, it may not be cost 
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 effective for the Air Force to increase its budget in hopes of making up the difference 
from decreased overruns.  The coefficient on this variable implies that by increasing the 
total budget by 1%, the amount of cost overruns will decrease by 0.17%.   The total 
budget of the Air Force is roughly $120B, increasing this by 1% would cost the Air Force 
$1.2B.  Overruns are typically in the area of $5.3B per year.  If the total budget is 
increased by 1%, it would be expected that overruns would decrease by 0.17% or $9.1M.  
This would end up costing the Air Force $1.19B.   Of course, the reverse is also true.  If 
the Air Force cuts the budget by 1%, the difference would be a savings of $1.19B.   
More research is needed into this area to fully understand the implications of 
budget changes, the resulting cost overruns, and the potential savings that could occur.   
A more micro view is probably needed.  Looking at the programs individually and 
looking to see if the program had a decrease in their budget, what did that do to their 
overruns?  Did the program continue spending at the previous rate and end up 
overrunning at the same amount that they were cut?  In which case, there would be no 
savings.  Did the program tighten up and spend more prudently and end up overrunning 
less than they were cut?  This would result in an overall net savings.  Or in the last 
scenario, did the program end up overrunning more than they were cut because schedules 
were slipped and requirements were delayed.  In this case, the cut in funds actually ended 
up costing the Air Force money.   
Also, the total budget variable should be looked at more closely.  This variable 
was significant, however the other budget variables, procurement and R&D, were not.  
These are the variables that you would expect to have an effect on overruns since the 
acquisition programs are funded with these appropriations.  Is it because procurement and 
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 R&D alone do not have an effect on overruns but the two together do?  If not, what is it 
about the total budget that is correlated with overruns?  Is it the MILCOM, O&M, or 
MILPERS portions?  If this is the case, causation couldn’t be inferred because these 
appropriations do not fund acquisition programs.   
 In conclusion, this research set out to determine if there is a relationship between 
human capital and cost overruns.  Based on previous literature, it was seen that a 
historical link has been established between performance levels, number of personnel and 
education levels.  Using the lessons learned from these studies and the theoretical 
relationship of inputs to outputs in the form of the Cobb-Douglas function, an analysis 
was conducted relating Air Force cost analysts to contract cost overruns.  From this 
analysis, it was seen that there is a significant relationship between the number of 
analysts, their education levels and the amount of cost overruns that occur.  Depending on 
the cost of acquiring new personnel and the cost of sending them to school, it is possible 
that the Air Force could garner significant savings by adding more analysts with higher 
education levels.  Other policy implications from the study are the importance of 
maintaining stable budgets and of accurately predicting inflation.  In addition, the 
DAWIA act was seen to have a decreasing effect on overruns.   
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 Appendix A: Variance Inflation Factor 
 
Variable       VIF         
 
ln (Mil/Civ Analysts)      7.46   
DAWIA       5.36 
ln (capital)       4.71 
Total Budget Change (2 Lags)    4.53 
ln (Defense Employment)     3.61 
ln (Mil/Civ Education)     2.71 
Procurement Budget Change (2 Lags)   2.68 
ln (AFIT Grads)      2.48   
 R&D Budget Change (2 Lags)    2.23 
Unexpected Inlfation      2.13 
 
Mean VIF       3.79 
 
 
 
Table 5: Variance Inflation Factor 
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 Appendix B:  Variance of Residuals 
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Figure 3:  Variance of Residuals 
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Appendix C: Distribution of the Error Terms 
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Figure 4: Error term distribution 
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